KYIV, Ukraine — In August, North Korean state media released photos of Kim Jong-un bowing before the portraits of soldiers killed in Ukraine, hugging grieving families and pinning medals on returning troops. In a rare display of public mourning, the North Korean leader described the fallen as “great heroes” and “martyrs,” his “heart aching” at their loss.
For Pyongyang, the human cost of involving its armed forces in Ukraine was real: South Korean intelligence estimates that nearly 600 North Korean soldiers have died in the conflict and thousands more have been wounded since an initial deployment of 11,000 elite soldiers were sent to Russia in late 2024.
But while Mr. Kim has lamented the loss of the fallen soldiers, his regime appears to have gained something invaluable: battlefield experience in a modern, large-scale war.
The fighting in Ukraine has increasingly been defined and shaped by drones, which now account for the majority of battlefield casualties. And for North Korea’s military — long reliant on aging Soviet doctrine and equipment — the exposure to such technology and tactics has been transformative.
Propaganda footage from the Kursk front has shown North Korean troops drilling to counter enemy drones and also deploying their own.
More strikingly, the North Koreans have moved quickly to integrate into combat first-person-view drones, piloted by trained operators working in teams with real-time surveillance feeds.
Analysts say this indicates Pyongyang has begun to master the basics of linking reconnaissance with strike assets, an impressive leap for a force once defined by its rigid, centralized command.
Mr. Kim himself signaled this new priority last year, ordering the mass production of “suicide drones” and overseeing tests of loitering munitions.
Reports suggest Russia has provided technical assistance for kamikaze drones modeled on Iran’s Shahed-136, with North Korea dispatching specialists to Russian drone training centers.
The Kursk footage also revealed new anti-armor tactics, most notably the mounting of advanced Bulsae-4 anti-tank guided missiles on civilian pickup trucks instead of costly armored carriers. That improvisation allowed Pyongyang to field more mobile launchers at a lower cost — a development that will complicate the task of enemy armor on the Korean Peninsula.
Older Bulsae-2 and Bulsae-3 systems were also shown in use, highlighting a willingness to experiment across generations of weapons. The combination of mobility and precision-guided firepower points to a military adapting its arsenal for modern, asymmetric warfare.
Equally important is what Pyongyang seems to be learning about battlefield communications: Footage has shown North Korean soldiers using Russian-made Azart tactical radios, capable of digital modes, frequency hopping and satellite synchronization. Command posts, meanwhile, combined digital mapping software with live drone feeds.
For a military long hampered by outdated, centralized control, these makeshift but functional battlefield awareness systems represent a significant evolution. Exposure to Russian electronic warfare and command practices could reshape Pyongyang’s doctrine for years to come.
Beyond battlefield lessons, North Korea has also reaped significant financial and technological rewards.
According to a German think tank, Pyongyang has earned between $1.7 billion and $5.5 billion from selling arms to Moscow since 2023, plus as much as $500 million annually from troop deployments.
Russia, in turn, has reportedly provided North Korea with assistance in building air-defense systems, tanks equipped with modern electronic warfare suites, a destroyer armed with supersonic cruise missiles and advanced air-to-air weapons.
For Adam Simpson, a senior lecturer at the University of South Australia, the consequences are clear. North Korea’s involvement, he writes, “is transforming it into a much more capable and technologically advanced rogue state in East Asia.”
The war has given Pyongyang “valuable modern combat experience using artificial intelligence and drones against a highly skilled Ukrainian military,” he said, while Russian forces have tested North Korean missiles in combat, bolstering future research and development.
Mr. Simpson concludes starkly: “Its antiquated systems, historically limited by isolation and sanctions, are now being rapidly transformed, making it a much more formidable foe.”
The ripple effects of the modernization of North Korea’s armed forces could extend far beyond Asia, as the country has long exported weapons to militant groups and sanctioned regimes, from the Palestinian Hamas to African militias.
A Pyongyang armed with combat-tested drones, mobile missile systems and enhanced communications could export both hardware and expertise, amplifying instability worldwide.
For South Korea, this evolving threat poses difficult questions.
President Lee Jae-myung, in office since June, has so far favored a softer diplomatic approach toward Pyongyang, even dismantling propaganda speakers on the border.
But as Mr.Simpson notes, the pace of North Korea’s military transformation may soon force Seoul to “reassess its security strategies in an increasingly challenging international environment.”
Financial constraints will limit how quickly North Korea can scale its battlefield innovations across its entire force, however the experience gained in Ukraine ensures that these lessons will not be lost.
